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Prevention of Unfair Business Practices in
California: A Proposal for Effective
Regulation
By Rod Divelbiss*
Consumers in California traditionally have benefited from pro-
tective legislation and far-reaching judicial determinations in their
battle against unfair business practices.1 Nevertheless, section
172002 of the California Business and Professions Code, potentially
an important resource in the enforcement of consumer rights, has
remained relatively dormant since its enactment in 1933.3 Section
17200 provides that it is unlawful for a person or business to per-
form any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice that
may affect either consumers or other business enterprises.4
The absence of standards for determining what constitutes
"unfairness" in the context of section 17200 is the primary reason
for the statute's ineffectiveness. Additionally, recent judicial devel-
opments threaten to deny the remedy of damages to consumers
* B.A., 1977, University of Santa Clara; J.D., 1980, University of California, Hastings
College of the Law.
1. See Note, Former Civil Code Section 3369: A Study in Judicial Interpretation, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 705 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Former Civil Code Section 3369.
2. Former CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (currently codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §8
17200-17208 (West Supp. 1980) (as amended 1977)). The 1977 Amendment repealed § 3369
from the California Civil Code and enacted identical provisions in the California Business &
Professions Code at §§ 17200-17208. Throughout this Note CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §8
17200-17208 will be referred to collectively as § 17200.
3. The dearth of cases decided under § 17200 may be the result of the common prac-
tice of reaching a settlement agreement in an action before trial. See Former Civil Code
Section 3369, supra note 1, at 714 n.53. See generally Project, The Direct Selling Industry:
An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 883 (1969); Note, Unfair Competition and the
Consumer-Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association, Inc., 24 HASTINGS L.J. 537, 549
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Unfair Competition and the Consumer].
4. "As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, un-
fair or fraudulent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising
and any act prohibited by Chapter I (commencing with Section 17500) or Part 3 of Division
7 of the Business and Professions Code." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp.
1980).
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who successfully pursue claims under section 17200.1 It is doubtful
consumers will bring suit to enforce their rights when they will be
burdened with costly litigation expenses even if their claim is suc-
cessful,' thus leaving public interest groups and government agen-
cies as the primary vehicles for enforcing claims against unfair bus-
iness practices.7 As recent history aptly illustrates, relegating sole
* responsibility for pursuing claims under section 17200 to public in-
terest groups and government agencies has led to woefully inade-
quate protection against unfair business practices for California
consumers.
This Note offers three proposals for ensuring the effectiveness
of section 17200 in protecting California consumers against unfair
business practices. First, the rules and decisions interpreting sec-
tion 58 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) should be
adopted to establish minimum standards of business conduct in
California.9 If the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has deter-
mined that a practice is unfair, California courts should accord-
ingly hold that the practice is unfair and violative of section 17200.
Section 5 and section 17200 are virtually identical in language,10
5. In Chern v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1976), the California Supreme Court refused to award damages for injuries resulting from
an unfair business practice. The court, relying on the statutory language of former § 3369,
held that an injunction was the appropriate remedy in an action brought by a private party.
See notes 102-10 & accompanying text infra.
6. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective Pro-
grams for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 409 (1966).
7. See id. See also Former Civil Code Section 3369, supra note 1.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1979). Section 5 states in part: "Unfair meth-
ods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. See text accompanying notes 15-60 infra.
See also Note, Unfairness Without Deception: Recent Positions of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 5 Loy. CHi. L.J. 537 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FTC Unfairness Doctrine].
9. Many states specifically incorporate FTC decisions or federal court interpretations
of the FTCA into their consumer protection statutes. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
93A, 2(b) (West Supp. 1980); Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 316 N.E.2d 748
(1974); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(d) (McKinney Supp. 1979); In re Lefkowitz v. Colorado
State Christian College of the Church of the Inner Power, Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 50, 346 N.Y.S.2d
482 (1973). Other states incorporate only the interpretation of the FTCA given by federal
courts and not rulings by the FTC. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §
17.46(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1979) (pursuant to 1977 amendments, Texas now incorporates
FTC rulings for injunctive actions by the state, but not for private consumer actions for
damages). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (West 1978). For a general discussion and
a comprehensive statistical analysis of the states adopting FTC rulings and interpretations
as authority for their consumer legislation, see C. SMrrH & C. WHiTE, FTC TRADE REGULA-
rioN 433-39, 451-54 (1979).
10. See notes 89-90 & accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 32
UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES
historical development, 1 and underlying purpose, 2 thereby ensur-
ing that adoption of FTC standards would further the legislative
intent to protect consumer rights that is found in section 17200.
Moreover, acceptance of this proposal would draw upon the widely
acknowledged expertise of the FTC's as well as provide for more
predictable enforcement of section 17200. Finally, adoption of FTC
standards would ensure that California businesses have notice of
prohibited activities through FTC publication of the business prac-
tices that have been determined to be unfair.14 This Note further
argues that damages should be available to private litigants bring-
ing suit under the unfairness provision of section 17200. Finally, it
will be shown that if the California courts adopt the FTC stan-
dards of unfairness, punitive damages are an appropriate remedy
for intentional violations of section 17200.
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States,'5 the Senate authorized the Inter-
state Commerce Commission to conduct a comprehensive investi-
gation of the inadequacies of the Sherman Antitrust Act.'6 As a
result of this study, President Wilson called for substantive legisla-
tion prohibiting unfair practices in a business competition con-
text 17 and for the creation of a government agency to oversee im-
plementation of this legislation. 8 This directive led to the passage
of the Federal Trade Commission Act' 9 and creation of the Federal
11. See note 91 & accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 84-90 & accompanying text infra.
13. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); Jacob Siegel Co. v.
FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946). See also FTC Unfairness Doctrine, supra note 7, at 560.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (1976). See 1 S. KANWiT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 6.03
(1979) [hereinafter cited as KANwrr].
15. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Standard Oil involved an unlawful combination formed by
Standard Oil in order to dominate and control the oil industry. The Supreme Court held
that violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act demanded a twofold remedy: first, to forbid the
continuance of the illegal acts of combination; and second, to dissolve the existing combina-
tion to neutralize the existing monopoly. Id. at 77-78. See also United States v. America
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (a companion case).
16. 47 CoNG. REc. 1225-26 (1911). The report was presented in February of 1913. See
S. REP. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913).
17. See S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1914).
18. 51 CONG. Rac. 1978-79 (1914).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976 & Supp. I 1978).
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Trade Commission.2 Recognizing that the FTC would develop ex-
pertise in the regulation of unfair business practices, Congress in-
tentionally left section 5 of the FTCA rather vague in order to al-
low the Commission a measure of discretion in determining the
acts or practices that are unfair and thus prohibited under section
5.21
The authority of the FTC initially was given a narrow inter-
pretation by the courts. In the 1920 decision of FTC v. Gratz,22 the
FTC's power to enjoin a tying agreement23 as an unfair practice
was challenged. The Supreme Court held that the courts, not the
Commission, should determine whether the agreement was unfair
under section 5,2 thus limiting the Commission's power to prohibit
unfair business practices to enjoining practices that had previously
been declared unfair by the judiciary.
Eleven years later, the FTC's power was further limited by the
decision in FTC v. Raladam Co.25 Raladam claimed its product
was an effective and safe cure for obesity. Finding the product
neither an effective cure for obesity nor safe for human consump-
tion, the FTC issued a cease and desist order under section 5(b)(1)
of the FTCA.26 The Supreme Court revoked the order, holding
that the FTC had acted beyond. its jurisdiction because it had not
shown the marketing of the product produced adverse effects on
competition. 27 Although ample evidence was introduced to demon-
strate that the product was unhealthy and ineffective, the Supreme
Court allowed Raladam to continue marketing the product. 5
Despite these early restrictions, the jurisdiction of the FTC
eventually was significantly expanded. In FTC v. R.F. Keppet &
Bros., Inc.,29 the Supreme Court held that the marketing of candy
by using an element of chance to determine its price was an unfair
20. Id. § 41.
21. Id. See also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914); 51 CONG.
REc. 8856 (1914).
22. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
23. The tying agreement made the sale of cotton ties contingent upon the purchase of
cotton bagging, a separate item. Id. at 424.
24. Id. at 427.
25. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
26. This is the remedy generally employed by the FTC and is authorized by 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(b) (1976).
27. 283 U.S. at 648-50, 652-54.
28. Id.
29. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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business practice.30 Although the Court reiterated that unfairness
is primarily a question for judicial determination, it held that the
FTC's determination of unfairness is entitled to great deference
because the FTC is "a body specially competent to deal with [this
situation] by reason of information, experience and careful
study." 1 Keppel thus expressly rejected the Raladam requirement
that the activity adversely affect business competitors, and further
acknowledged the value of the FTC's definition of an unfair prac-
tice under section 5.
The adoption of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment32 of the FTCA
in 1938 codified the extension of section 5 to include the prohibi-
tion of unfair business practices perpetrated upon consumers. The
amendment provides that "unfair methods of competition" are un-
lawful.33 That the amendment was intended to include the inter-
ests of consumers within the protection of section 5 is indicated by
its legislative history: "[T]his amendment makes the consumer,
who may be injured by an unfair practice, of equal concern, before
the law with the merchant or manufacturer injured by unfair
methods of a dishonest competitor."3'
Until recent years, however, courts continued to follow the
holding in Gratz35 and restricted the FTC's power to promulgate
trade regulation rules regarding practices that had not been judi-
cially determined to be unfair. In 1964 the Commission neverthe-
less promulgated a rules6 requiring manufacturers to disclose that
cigarette smoking is "dangerous to health and may cause death
from cancer or other diseases. 3 7 Failure to disclose this informa-
tion was deemed to be an unfair business practice and thus viola-
tive of section 5.38 Eight years later, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchin-
son Co.,39 the Supreme Court cited and implicitly approved an
30. Id. at 308.
31. Id. at 314 (quoting S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1914)).
32. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)
(1976)).
33. Id.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). See also S. REP. No. 1705, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
35. See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); FTC v. Curtis Publish-
ing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923). See also FTC Unfairness Doctrine, supra note 7, at 538-39.
36. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964).
37. Id. at 8325.
38. Id.
39. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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FTC statement that set forth factors for determining whether a
practice was unfair under section 5 as an appropriate guide to
standards of unfairness. 0
The decision in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC41
judicially acknowledged the FTC's power to promulgate substan-
tive rules. National Petroleum involved a challenge to the Com-
mission's authority to issue rules defining illegal conduct. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the legislative
history and the language of the FTCA and concluded that the
Commission was empowered to issue substantive rules.42
The FTC Improvement Act of 197543 confirmed the Commis-
sion's authority to promulgate substantive rules by authorizing the
Commission to "explore, identify and define those competitive
practices that should be forbidden as 'unfair' because [they are]
contrary to public policy."44 Section 1845 of the FTCA provides
that the FTC may make broad interpretive rules as well as sub-
stantive rules "to define with specificity conduct that violates the
statute and to establish requirements to prevent unlawful con-
duct. '46 After 1975 it was thus firmly established that the FTC is
empowered to interpret "unfairness" in business practices through
both promulgation of trade regulation rules and adjudicatory
proceedings.
47
40. These factors included: "(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes,
the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra
of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is
immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers." Id. at 244 n.5 (quoting 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964)).
41. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
42. 482 F.2d at 697-98. The court in National Petroleum refered to a bill introduced
in the Senate, S. 986, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), that would have severely curtailed the
FTC's substantive rulemaking power in the area of "unfair and deceptive practices." 482
F.2d at 697 n.40. This bill did not pass but it was nevertheless reintroduced in 1973 as a
part of the Magnuson-Moss Act. The House portion of this bill would have completely elim-
inated FTC power to promulgate rules regulating competitive matters, see H.R. 9717, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1973), but the language was removed following Senate opposition.
43. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193.
44. 29 Fed. Reg. 8349 (1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1976). For a general discussion of the provision, see KANwrr,
supra note 14, ch. 6.
46. H.R. RaP. No. 93-1606, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974).
47. The United States Supreme Court has held that when an agency is vested with
both adjudicative and legislative powers the agency may impose regulatory controls by gen-
eral rules or ad hoc litigation. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
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Proceedings to promulgate trade regulation rules may be com-
menced by the Commission on its own initiative or pursuant to any
petition filed with the FTC stating reasonable grounds for the ne-
cessity of instituting a particular rule.48 Prior to any proceeding,
however, notice must be published in the Federal Register and, to
the extent practicable, made available to all interested parties.49
The Commission is also required to accept all information concern-
ing the proposed rule until forty-five days before commencement
of the rulemaking proceeding.50 At the close of the proceeding, the
Commission may issue any appropriate rule51 prohibiting unfair
practices adversely affecting the public interest, 2 which thereafter
carries the force of substantive law. Judicial challenge to these
rules is limited to questions of their legality and the scope of the
Commission's jurisdictional authority.53 In order to establish a vio-
lation of section 5, the Commission need only show knowledge and
violation of the regulation. The violation of an FTC regulation is
thus considered to be unfair per se.
The adjudicatory interpretations of "unfairness" often derive
from cease and desist actions brought under section 5." Under this
provision, the FTC can order a practice to be discontinued if the
Commission determines that the practice is unfair. 5 In order to
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976). See also 16 C.F.R. § 0.4 (1980). The FTC must still
comply with the standards and requirements imposed upon most federal agencies by the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
49. 16 C.F.R. § 1.26(b) (1980). An exception to the requirement of making a proposed
rule available to all interested persons is provided by § 1.26. No such availability is required
if the FTC, for good cause, "finds that notice and public procedure relating to the rule are
impractical, unnecessary or contrary to the public interest and [the FTC] incorporates such
finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefore in the rule." Id. The provision is
referred to as the FTC Rules of Practice. See also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
50. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(a) (1980).
51. These rules must be published in the Federal Register. 16 C.F.R. § 1.14 (1980).
52. 29 Fed. Reg. 8349 (1964).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)-(e) (1976). See Beltone Elec. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F. Supp. 590
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
54. The Commission will initially issue a cease and desist order under 15 U.S.C. §
45(b) (1976). Civil penalty actions may be brought under § 45(1) for violation of the order.
The Commission may also bring an action to recover civil penalties for violation of a trade
regulation rule or a prior agency determination under § 45(m). Additionally, 1973 amend-
ments added § 53(b), allowing the FTC to seek injunctive relief for any violations or
threatened violations of the Act. Act of November 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. IV, §
408(f), 87 Stat. 592.
55. Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1976), the maximum penalty for a continuing failure to
obey an FTC order is $10,000 per day. Such penalties accrue only after an order becomes
final and while an order is in effect. Civil penalty actions for such violations are subject to a
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determine if a cease and desist order should issue, the Commission
must first decide if the practice in question is unfair. If the prac-
tice is found to be unfair, a party subject to the final cease and
desist order may be assessed substantial penalties for continuing
practices which violate the order. Moreover, nonparties can be
charged with violation of the cease and desist order and subject to
civil penalties if they are found to be engaged in substantially simi-
lar acts or practices. 56 The FTC ensures that companies which may
engage in activities similar to the prohibited acts and practices re-
ceive notice of the unlawfulness of such actions and of the possible
civil penalties for engaging in such conduct. 7
The Commission's power to regulate trade practices is now
virtually unequaled. 8 Its jurisdiction encompasses both practices
between competitors and practices that solely affect consumers.
Furthermore, the Commission is given wide latitude to enforce sec-
tion 559 because of its expertise in determining whether particular
remedies will be effective in eliminating unfair trade practices. The
FTC has comprehensively defined and codified the term "unfair"
through its adjudicatory determinations and trade regulation
rules" and thus has become better prepared to fulfill its function
of promoting confidence in the marketplace and eliminating uneth-
ical practices in the business community.
Section 17200 of the California
Business and Professions Code
Liability for unfair competition in California originally was
five year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1976). See FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F.
Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1978).
56. See KANwrr, supra note 14, § 10.09.
57. See id. This procedure has been criticized by an FTC Commissioner. Pitofsky,
FTC Improvement Act, 45 A.B.A. ANTITRusT L.J. 117, 119-20 (1976).
58. Recent congressional hearings, however, indicate that the FTC jurisdiction will
soon be limited and its rulemaking authority subject to congressional veto. See ANTrrRusT &
TRADE REG. R". (BNA) No. 941, at A-24 (Nov. 29, 1979).
59. See notes 21, 29-31 & accompanying text supra.
60. Countless business practices have been held unlawful under this two pronged ap-
proach. One commentator notes that "[tlhe types of sales practices which have been found
unfair by the FTC have been limited only to the extent of the seller's imagination." FTC
Unfairness Doctrine, supra note 8, at 546. For an exhaustive list of practices labeled "un-
fair" by the FTC, see 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 7903-7960. See also 16BE J. VON KALINOW-
SKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 41.01 (1979).
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grounded in tort law,61 which permitted the victim of an unfair
business practice to recover damages for interference with prospec-
tive advantage. 62 This cause of action, however, was limited to
suits instituted between business competitors.63 Although prohibi-
tion of unfair practices extended to infringement of trade names
tending to confuse the public," the prevailing common law rule for
consumers was caveat emptor.
In 1933, the predecessor to California Business and Profes-
sions Code section 17200, former Civil Code section 3369, was re-
vised to impose statutory liability for engaging in acts of unfair
competition. 5 It provided that any act of unfair competition oc-
curring within California may be enjoined.66 Subsequent amend-
ments have not significantly altered the substantive provisions of
the statute.6 7
Initially, former Civil Code section 3369 was invoked exclu-
sively to enjoin infringements upon the use of trade names.6 8 When
a business had developed an identity with a trade name commonly
known to the public, the courts considered use of that trade name
by competing enterprises to be unfair.6" The California Supreme
Court extended the protection against infringement of a trade
name in Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Benson.70
61. See, e.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. American Auto. Owners Ass'n, 216 Cal. 125, 13
P.2d 707 (1932); Yellow Cab Co. v. Sachs, 191 Cal. 238, 216 P. 33 (1923); Dunston v. Los
Angeles Van Co., 165 Cal. 89, 131 P. 115 (1913). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 949-69
(4th ed. 1971).
62. W. PROSsER, LAw OF TORTS 949-69 (4th ed. 1971). Interference with prospective
advantage dealt with the use of violence or threats of violence to drive customers from the




65. Prior to 1933, CAL. CIv. CODE § 3369 read: "Neither specific nor preventative relief
can be granted to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law,
except in a case of nuisance or unfair competition." See Former Civil Code Section 3369,
supra note 1, at 706 n.5.
66. Former CAL. Civ. CODE § 3369(5) (currently codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§
17200-17208 (West Supp. 1980) (as amended 1977)).
67. Id. See also Former Civil Code Section 3369, supra note 1.
68. See Former Civil Code Section 3369, supra note 1, at 706-08. See generally Note,
Unfair Competition and the Consumer-Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association, Inc.,
24 HASTMNGs L.J. 537 (1973).
69. See Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1971); MacSweeney Enterprises, Inc. v. Taratino, 106 Cal. App. 2d 504, 235 P.2d 266
(1951).
70. 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940).
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Without restricting the scope of the statute to activities affecting
competitors, the court held that in order to establish a violation
under former Civil Code section 3369 it need only be proven that
the alleged act "violates the fundamental rules of honesty and fair
dealing, '7 1 thus implicitly holding that an act unfair to the public
at large was unlawful regardless of its effect on business
competitors.
In 1962, the California Court of Appeal in the case of People
ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. 72 removed most of the re-
maining impediments to the use of former Civil Code section 3369
in preventing unfair business practices that affect consumers. Na-
tional Research printed forms that were similar to official docu-
ments used by the California Department of Motor Vehicles and
the Department of Education. The forms, known as "skiptracers,"
were sold to collection agencies in California that recorded the
names and last known addresses of debtors on the forms and
mailed the forms back to National Research in Sacramento, the
state capitol. National Research then mailed the forms to the debt-
ors asking for their addresses, driver's license numbers, vehicle li-
cense numbers, and places of employment, as well as other perti-
nent information. The forms appeared to be official and debtors
willingly responded by returning the forms to National Research.
The court first noted that application of former Civil Code section
3369 was not restricted to claims involving alleged trade name infr-
ingment.7' The court stated that the FTC had previously declared
the use of "skiptracers" in this manner to be unfair and illegal, and
"[iln view of the similarity of the language and obvious identity of
purpose of the two statutes, decisions of the federal court as to
what business practices are unfair are more than ordinarily persua-
sive."74 Thus, the court's analogy potentially broadened the scope
of former Civil Code section 3369 to apply in every circumstance in
which the FTC had declared a given practice unfair under section
5.
Notwithstanding this sequence of precedent, recent California
decisions have left the breadth of the California unfairness doc-
trine undefined. In Barquis v. Merchants Collection Association
71. Id. at 691, 104 P.2d at 653 (quoting American Philatelic Soc'y v. Clairbourne, 3
Cal. 2d 689, 46 P.2d 135 (1935)).
72. 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
73. Id. at 770, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
74. Id. at 773, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
Inc.,7 5 the California Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta that
unfairness encompassed not only fraudulent practices but also in-
cluded business practices that were not fraudulent but neverthe-
less were unfair under principles of business morality and fair
dealing.7 6 Justice Tobriner stated that "section 3369. . .does not
limit its coverage to . . 'deceptive' practices, but instead explic-
itly extends to any 'unlawful, unfair or deceptive business prac-
tice.' ",7 He further noted: "[T]he Legislature... intended by this
sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going wrongful
business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur. '7 8
The decision indicates that the concept of unfairness under the
present proscription of unfair business practices contained in sec-
tion 17200 is distinguishable from the concepts of fraud and decep-
tion, and that wrongful activity not characterized as fraudulent
may still be unlawful in California. Unfortunately, the court in
Barquis was not presented with an opportunity to consider fully
the unfairness question; because the conduct at issue violated stat-
utory venue requirements, it was enjoined under section 17200 as
an unlawful business practice."9
Four years later, the California Supreme Court, in Chern v.
Bank of America,0 again failed to provide adequate standards for
evaluating the statutory meaning of "unfairness." Chern involved
the defendant's use of a 360-day year to compute interest rates.
The actual rate charged for a loan was thus slightly higher than
the advertised rate.81 The court held the practice unfair under the
predecessor to section 17200. In considering the term "unfair," the
court urged that the statute "affords protection against the
probability or likelihood as well as the actuality of deception or
confusion. '82 The court did not, however, attempt to define unfair-
75. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
76. Id. at 111, 496 P.2d at 829, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
77. Id.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 112, 496 P.2d at 830, 101 Cal Rptr. at 758.
80. 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976).
81. In Chern, the rate quoted over the phone was 9% but computed on a 360-day
year, thus inflating the rate to 9.13%. Although the difference was relatively insignificant in
terms of individual borrowers, the total annual increases in revenue for Bank of America
amounted to approximately $5,000,000. See Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant at 2, Chern
v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976).
82. 15 Cal. 3d at 876, 544 P.2d at 1316, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 116 (quoting Payne v. United
California Bank, 23 Cal. App. 3d 850, 856, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672, 678 (1972)).
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ness or analogize it to the FTC's interpretation of unfairness under
section 5 of the FTCA.5
Section 5 As A Guideline For California
Despite acknowledging that section 5 is "persuasive prece-
dent," and notwithstanding the similarity in language between sec-
tions 5 and 17200, California courts have failed to set forth even
minimum standards of fairness for business practices affecting con-
sumers. Recognition of decisions under section 5 of the FTCA as a
minimum standard of conduct in California would serve this vital
function.
Although it is difficult to uncover the precise legislative pur-
pose of section 17200," a central purpose may be inferred from
judicial interpretation of the statute. Barquis interpreted section
17200 to prohibit not only deceptive and fraudulent conduct, but
also wrongful business conduct.85 Wrongful generally implies a vio-
lation of the basic tenets of honesty and fair dealing,8 6 encompass-
ing practices which are not illegal as such, but that nonetheless
disturb the conscience of the common person. "Wrongful prac-
tices," as defined in Barquis, includes those acts that should not be
allowed under general principles of fairness, even if they are other-
wise within the narrow confines of the law. Thus, it would appear
that the primary purpose of section 17200 and the purpose of the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment to section 5 are identical in their under-
lying commitment to eliminate practices that are not fair to con-
sumers and thus adversely affect the public interest.
The similarity of language in section 17200 and section 5 fur-
ther illustrates their identity of purpose. Both statutes proscribe a
wide range of conduct: section 17200 prohibits "unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or mis-
leading advertising"87 while section 5 prohibits "unfair or decep-
83. The court did recognize that federal regulations, requiring information concerning
competing credit plans be supplied to bank customers, support the decision in Chem. Id. at
877, 544 P.2d at 1316, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 116. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1(a)(2), 226.101(a)-(c)
(1980).
84. But see note 114 & accompanying text infra.
85. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 111, 496 P.2d 817, 831, 101
Cal. Rptr. 745, 757 (1972).
86. See id. at 112, 496 P.2d at 830, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
87. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West Supp. 1980).
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tive acts or practices." 's Section 17200 was purposefully drafted in
rather vague terms to ensure that novel schemes involving unfair
business practices would be unlawful under its provisions.8 9 Simi-
larly, the language in section 5 is virtually unrestricted to ensure
the FTC's power to restrict any business practices that might be
considered unfair.90 •
Both section 5 and section 17200 have been judicially ex-
panded as the need for more stringent regulation of the business
practices affecting consumers was recognized. Only after discarding
the narrow construction of the statutes as prohibiting only unfair
practices between business competitors and overruling many deci-
sions imposing significant jurisdictional restrictions upon the right
to enforce claims under these statutes were the unfairness doc-
trines under each statute evolved to accord protection to the con-
sumer. This parallel development"1 demonstrates that the primary
concern of both statutes is protection of the consumer from im-
moral or unethical acts and practices. Thus, decisions rendered by
the FTC and federal courts, as well as trade regulations issued by
the FTC, should be recognized as establishing minimum standards
of conduct for businesses in California. Such an application would
effectively define permissible acts and would guide California con-
sumers in their decision to seek redress without unduly restricting
the scope of the statute. Furthermore, adoption of FTC standards
would give businesses actual knowledge of specific practices that
have already been considered and determined to be unfair.92
Recovery of Damages Under Section 17200
Section 17200 must allow the recovery of both compensatory
and punitive damages in order to provide consumers with an effec-
tive remedy against unfair business practices.93 Private enforce-
88. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1979).
89. See American Philatelic Soc'y v. Clairbourne, 3 Cal. 2d 689, 698, 46 P.2d 135, 140
(1935); see also International Ass'n of Cleaning & Dye House Workers v. Landowitz, 20 Cal.
2d 418, 126 P.2d 609 (1942).
90. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914). See also 51 CONG. REC.
8856 (1914); 29 Fed. Reg. 8349 (1964).
91. See notes 15-47, 50-75 & accompanying text supra.
92. See footnote 57 & accompanyng text supra.
93. This is particularly significant because § 5 of the FTCA does not provide for a
private right of action. Thus California consumers cannot vindicate their rights under fed-
eral law. Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971), af'd, 485 F.2d
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ment of the statute is ineffective without offering consumers the
economic incentive to bring suit. Unfair business practices flourish
when such conduct is rewarded by economic gain. Injunctive relief
allows those engaging in unfair business activities to retain the eco-
nomic gains reaped from such schemes prior to the issuance of the
injunction. If injunctive relief is the sole remedy for protecting
consumers against unlawful practices, the development of novel
schemes that are not within the ambit of prior injunctions will be
encouraged. Effective enforcement of the prohibition against unfair
business practices requires that those engaging in such conduct be
liable for compensatory damages for unlawful gains and, under ap-
propriate circumstances, be subject to exemplary damages as a de-
terrent to future unfair business practices. 4
Section 17203 of the Business and Professions Code states
that "[a]ny person performing or proposing to perform an act of
unfair competition within this state may be enjoined. .... ,,95 The
existence of injunctive relief does not preclude private rights of ac-
tion for damages under section 17200.6 Nevertheless, ambiguities
plaguing the California Supreme Court's decision in Chern v. Bank
of America97 arguably compel the conclusion that'private litigants
may seek only injunctive relief under section 17200.98 Such an in-
terpretation disregards prior damage awards recovered by-private
parties under section 17200 and its predecessor.9 " It also disregards
the court of appeal's holding in United Farm Workers v. Superior
Court,100 just one year before Chern, in which the court recognized
that "the breach of a duty imposed by [the predecessor to section
17200] gives rise to a cause of action for damages if damages can
986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
94. In Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 591 P.2d 51, 153 Cal. Rptr.
28 (1979), the California Supreme Court emphasized the deterrent aspect of California con-
sumer laws. The court urged that" '[t]o permit the [retention of even] a portion of the illicit
profits, would impair the full impact of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate
'enforcement [of the law] is to be achieved. One requirement of such enforcement is a basic
policy that those who have engaged in proscribed conduct surrender all profits flowing
therefrom."' Id. at 451, 591 P.2d at 57, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (quoting SEC v. Golconda
Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
95. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 17204 (emphasis added).
97. 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976).
98. Id. at 875, 544 P.2d at 1314-15, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15.
99. See, e.g., Hesse v. Grossman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 536, 313 P.2d 625 (1957); Wood v.
Peffer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 116, 130 P.2d 220 (1942).
100. 47 Cal. App. 3d 334, 120 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1975).
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be shown. The fact that the statutes sound in equity and by their
terms do not specify that damages may be awarded does not bar
the recovery of damages . .. .,,o0
A careful analysis of the factual setting and the precise hold-
ing in Chern refutes an interpretation that Chern bars claims for
damages under section 17200. Further, three independent factors
operate to support the right to recovery of damages under section
17200. First, the legislature's amendment to former Civil Code sec-
tion 3369, the predecessor to section 17200, following the Chern
decision provided for a right to damages under the statute. Second,
recovery of damages under section 17200 may be justified under a
tort in essence theory whereby a statutory violation is treated as
the equivalent of a tortious act. Third, past decisions granting
monetary awards in actions brought under former Civil Code sec-
tion 3369 compel the right to recover damages under section 17200
under principles of stare decisis.
Chern v. Bank of America
Chern v. Bank of America"0 2 involved a class action for breach
of contract, damages, and injunctive relief. The plaintiff, Gertrude
Chern, telephoned the defendant, Bank of America, to arrange a
$5,000 loan. She was informed that the rate of interest on the loan
would be 9%, and was presented with a $5,000 promissory note
bearing a 9% per annum interest rate. Subsequently, however, she
was shown a Federal Truth in Lending Statement that indicated
the loan was actually at a 9 /% annual rate. Ms. Chern informed
the bank of this discrepancy but nevertheless executed the re-
quired forms after a bank employee explained that the difference
resulted from the bank's use of a 360-day year to compute interest.
After careful consideration, the court dismissed both the claim
for damages based upon breach of contract and the claim for dam-
ages based upon false and misleading statements under section
17500 of the Business and Professions Code.1 03 The court held that
Ms. Chern's knowledge of the 9 % interest rate at the time she
signed the loan agreement barred her right to recovery of damages
101. Id. at 334, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 911. It should be noted that the California Supreme
Court in Fletcher cites United Farm Workers with approval. 23 Cal. 3d at 452-53, 591 P.2d
at 58, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
102. 15 Cal. 3d 866, 544 P.2d 1310, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1976).
103. Id. at 873-74, 544 P.2d at 1314-15, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15.
UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICESSeptember 1980]
for breach of contract.'0 The court further held that section 17500
of the Business and Professions Code, which prohibits the making
of false or misleading statements in business practices, may only
be enforced by the issuance of an injunction and did not give rise
to an action for recovery of damages. 105 The injunctive relief
granted by the court in Chern arose from violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17535 and the predecessor to section
17200, former Civil Code section 3369.106
Although Chern concluded that Business and Professions
Code section 17500, a provision with language similar to section
17200,107 does not authorize recovery of damages, 08 it should not
be construed to bar the recovery of damages under section 17200.
Damages were denied only under Business and Professions Code
sections 17500, 17535, and 17536.109 No claim for damages was in-
stituted under the theory that the defendant's conduct constituted
an unfair business practice," 0 and thus Chern does not limit the
remedies available under section 17200 to injunctive relief."' Once
it is determined that the right to recover damages under section
17200 is not precluded by the decision in Chern, the question
arises whether the judiciary should allow a private right of action
for damages to be brought under section 17200. The legislative his-
tory of section 17200, cases decided under section 17200 and its
predecessor, as well as relevant legal doctrine, support the conclu-
sion that section 17200 allows a private right of action for damages.
In 1976, after the decision in Chern, division 6 of former Civil
Code section 3369 was amended to state: "Unless otherwise ex-
pressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by this sec-
tion and Section 3370.1 are cumulative to each other and to the
remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this
state.""12 By application, the California Legislature expressly au-
thorizes any remedy available under the laws of California, includ-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 875, 544 P.2d at 1315, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
106. Id. at 875-76, 544 P.2d at 1315-16, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 115-16.
107. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West Supp. 1980).
108. 15 Cal. 3d at 875, 544 P.2d at 1315, 127 Cal Rptr. at 115.
109. See id. at 873-75, 544 P.2d at 1314-15, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15.
110. Id. at 873, 544 P.2d at 1314, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
111. In fact, discussion of former Civil Code § 3369, the predecessor of § 17200, is
noticably absent in the portion of the opinion in Chern regarding damages.
112. Cal. Stat. 1976, ch. 1005, § 1, at 2378 (emphasis added). This section has now
been codified at CAL. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17205 (West Supp. 1980).
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ing compensatory and exemplary damages, to a litigant who com-
mences an action under section 17200.113 Moreover, because
complaints under this statute can be instituted by "any person act-
ing for the interests of itself, its members or the general public,
114
private actions to enforce the unfairness doctrine are not limited to
an injunction.
The legislative history of the amendment further indicates the
intent of the legislature to provide private litigants with a right to
pursue a claim for damages under section 17200. The Assembly
File Analysis1 5 states:
Under existing law, an injunction can be obtained against any
person engaging in an act of unfair competition .... This bill
provides that when an injunction is sought, the court can make
whatever orders or judgment as may be necessary to prevent fur-
ther acts of unfair competition or to restore property to those
who lost it as a result of unfair competition. This bill seeks to
close this loophole by which some businesses seek to avoid the
imposition of the more severe unfair competition penalties by
providing that the remedies and penalties contained in the Civil
Code are cumulative to each other and all other laws of this
state.
116
113. Another possible basis for awarding monetary recovery to private litigants injured
by unfair business practices is recovery in restitution. This theory was accepted by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 192 (1973), where the court recognized that a statute prohibiting unfair advertising
gives rise to restitution. The court analogized § 17535 of the Business and Professions Code
to provisions embodied in former Civil Code § 3369, and concluded that injunction provi-
sions were insufficient to enforce the law effectively. The imposition of an injunction, the
court stated, only serves to spur new, more creative, schemes that are not encompassed by
the language of the injunction. The incentive encourages the unscrupulous to devise differ-
ent schemes, reap the gains incurred as a result, and simply stop when an injunction is
issued. Without fear that compensation will be exacted, little or no economic incentive ex-
ists to refrain from engaging in the unfair practice and accumulating the temporary profits
arising from the practice. Therefore, the court held restitution was an appropriate remedy
for violations of § 17535. Id. at 289 n.3, 507 P.2d at 1404, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 196. The supreme
court recently extended this doctrine in Fletcher v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442,
591 P.2d 51, 153 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1979), holding that violation of § 17535 authorizes restitution
without "requiring the often impossible showing of the individual's lack of knowledge of the
fraudulent practice in each transaction." Id. at 451, 591 P.2d at 56-57, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
The court reasoned that to allow the wrongdoer to retain the benefits of his or her wrongdo-
ing would only encourage such conduct in the future.
114. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West Supp. 1980).
115. The Assembly File Analysis was an experimental project conducted by the Cali-
fornia Assembly Office of Research to compile legislative history on pending California legis-
lation. However, not all bills are included and the project operated only in 1976 and 1977.
116. ASSEMBLY FILE ANA.Ysis (1976) (emphasis added).
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Very simply, the legislature wanted to ensure that those engaging
in unlawful business activities would not retain the proceeds from
their unlawful activity.
The right to damages under section 17200 is further supported
by the "tort in essence" theory. The tort in essence theory, first set
forth in Czap v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley,'" creates a
private right of action for the violation of a statute that is designed
to protect the public. Czap held that the violation of a statute em-
bodying publid policy is actionable by a member of the class of
persons intended to be protected under the statute who is able to
demonstrate that he or she sustained injury from the violation of
the statute and establish causation between the breach of statutory
duty and such injury.118 Once these elements are proven, the
breach of statutory duty is considered a "tort in essence" and the
individual is entitled to the same relief, including damages, that
are available in an action under tort law, despite the absence of
express language in the statute that authorizes actions for
damages. 11 9
A consumer who is the victim of an unfair business practice
falls within the purview of this doctrine. The elements of injury
and causation raise factual questions.1 20 The third element, mem-
bership in the class intended to be benefited by the statute, is eas-
ily fulfilled by a consumer alleging injury because of an unfair bus-
iness practice. The decisions in National Research, Barquis, and
Chern all explicitly recognize that consumers are members of the
class of citizens that the statute was designed to protect. Thus,
117. 7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1970).
118. Id. at 6, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
119. Id. (citing Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n, 275 Cal. App. 2d 168, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 543 (1969)). The Cartwright Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16726 (West 1964
& Supp. 1980), another part of the California consumer protection law, does not expressly
provide a right to injunctive relief to a private party. However, California courts have long
held that if the statutory remedy is inadequate, judicial remedies will be imposed. Using
this rationale, injunctions have been issued for violation of the Cartwright Act. See Alfred
M. Lewis, Inc. v. Warehousemen, Local 542, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771, 330 P.2d 53 (1958); Kold
Kist, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen, 99 Cal. App. 2d 191, 221
P.2d 724 (1950). If an injunction may be appropriate where the Business and Professions
Code provides only for monetary damages, then conversely, if an injunction is inadequate,
damages should be awarded even though the statute refers only to injunctive relief.
120. In Chern, for example, the plaintiff demonstrated that she suffered damages
under a simple mathematical calculation based upon the amount borrowed, the interest
rate, and the repayment schedule. Causation was established by the relation between the
inflated interest rate produced under a 360-day formula used by the defendant and the
overpayments made by the plaintiff.
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consumers should be entitled to damages for the tortious act of
unfair competition.
A final rationale supporting the availability of the remedy of
damages under section 17200 rests on the doctrine of stare decisis.
California courts have awarded damages to private litigants in de-
cisions based upon the prohibition of unfair business practices.121
Chern did not expressly preclude the availability of damages for
consumers bringing suit under section 17200, and thus the past de-
cisions allowing the recovery of damages remain valid precedent in
California.
Punitive Damages
The availability of recovering punitive damages in actions
brought by private litigants under section 17200 should not be
foreclosed if section 17200 is to serve as a protector of consumer
rights. Punitive damages are not awarded in the absence of specific
statutory authorization 122 unless the one pursuing a claim is "the
immediate person injured" 123 by the wrongful conduct, and the re-
covery of punitive damages accords with legislative intent to im-
pose civil penalties upon those engaging in proscribed conduct.
1 24
Both requirements are present in private actions brought under
section 17200. A private litigant, unlike the state or other public
entity, must prove his or her status as the immediate person in-
jured by the alleged unfair business practice in order to state a
cause of action under section 17200. The legislative intent to pun-
ish unfair business practices is apparent in the 1972 amendment 2 5
to the statute imposing a civil penalty, recoverable in civil actions
by a district attorney or the attorney general, for the violation of
section 17200. An award of punitive damages is similar to the im-
position of a civil penalty; the effect in both cases is to deter future
offenses. The legislature has decided that violation of section 17200
warrants punishment to deter an offender; thus, exemplary dam-
ages should be available as a deterrent when a consumer brings a
private action under section 17200. If the recovery of punitive
121. See notes 99-101 & accompanying text supra.
122. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973).
123. Id. at 287, 507 P.2d at 1402-03, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
124. Id.
125. Cal. Stats. 1972, ch. 1084, § 2, at 2021 (adding CAL. Crv. CODE § 3370.1) (currently
codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17206 (West Supp. 1980)).
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damages is not available to consumers bringing private actions
under section 17200, the wrongdoer's ability to reap economic
gains from unlawful practices may depend on the fortuity of
whether his or her actions are curtailed in a suit brought by a pub-
lic official or a private individual.
The primary element of proof necessary for an award of exem-
plary damages is a showing of intentional wrongdoing.1 2 Actual
knowledge of the unfairness of the practice, coupled with willful
violation of a duty to refrain from such practices, forms the basis
for recovery of exemplary damages. This common law rule has
been codified in California to read:
In an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or mal-
ice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to actual dam-
ages, may recover exemplary damages for the sake of example and
by way of punishing the defendant.
127
A business that has actual knowledge of the unfairness of a
particular practice, but wilfully continues such a practice, should
be found to exhibit oppression 12 8 and malice. 29 If section 5 were to
be recognized as an appropriate standard for interpreting "unfair-
ness" in California, FTC decisions and trade regulations would
provide businesses with actual knowledge of the unfairness of their
practices. Where the unfair trade practice can be characterized as
a violation of defined standards for business conduct, the requisite
malice and oppression then can be inferred,30 thus warranting an
award of exemplary damages.
Both the 1976 amendment to former Civil Code section 3369
and the tort in essence theory authorize an award of punitive dam.
ages. Through the 1976 amendment, the legislature expressly pro-
vided that "the remedies or penalties provided by [section 17200]
are cumulative. . . to the remedies or penalties available under all
126. C. MCCORMCK, LAw OF DAMAGES 280 (1935).
127. CAL. Cv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
128. Oppression has been defined as subjecting a person to "cruel and unjust hardship
in conscious disregard of his rights." Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25
Cal. App. 3d 232, 246, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556 (1972).
129. Malice under § 3294 implies an act conceived in the spirit of mischief or ill will
with the intent to harm. Gombos v. Ashe, 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 322 P.2d 933 (1958). Such
malice may be inferred from the facts surrounding the case. Richardson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 245, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556 (1972).
130. Surely, a business practice which violates a known standard of fairness can be
characterized as an act conceived in the spirit of mischief or ill will with the intent to harm.
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other laws of this state." 13 1 One such law is California Civil Code
section 3294 which provides for punitive damages for the sake of
example and to punish the defendant."3 2 Similarly, a tortious
breach of a duty has long been recognized to authorize an award of
exemplary damages under appropriate circumstances.1 33 Violation
of section 17200 as a tort in essence leads to the conclusion that
this tortious violation warrants an award of punitive damages.
To understand why exemplary damages are needed to ensure
effective enforcement of section 17200, it is important to focus on
the practical aspects of consumer litigation. The most pronounced
barrier to initiation of suit by a consumer is the high cost of litiga-
tion. The usual consumer claim ranges from $25 to $100.11 Liti-
gants usually suffer a net loss in actions where recovery is under
$200.15 In most instances where consumers are the victims of un-
fair business practices it is therefore to the economic advantage of
the consumer to forego pursuit of any redress. Most businesses re-
alize this simple fact and accordingly have little incentive to re-
frain from unfair trade practices. Recognizing this problem a New
York court has stated:
In the calculation of his expected profits, the wrongdoer is likely
to allow for a certain amount of money which will have to be re-
turned to those who object too vigorously, and he will be perfectly
content to bear the additional cost of litigation as the price for
continuing his illicit business.13 6
The wrongdoer merely discounts a percentage of the revenue that
is derived from unfair business practices to be used for litigation
expenses. A business reaping economic gains from unfair business
practices may realize that only a small percentage of all the con-
sumers injured by such practices will pursue litigation. Assuming
that every consumer bringing suit recovers compensatory damages,
the business will still retain the earnings from the unfair practice
suffered by the consumers unwilling to sue. Consumer claims that
are not asserted because they are economically unattractive are ac-
131. Cal. Stats. 1976, ch. 1005, § 1, at 2378 (emphasis added). This section is currently
codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17205 (West Supp. 1980).
132. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
133. See id.
134. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers Into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966).
135. See id. at 403.
136. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488,
492 (1961).
September 1980]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cumulated by the enterprise as revenue from the unfair practice.
The deterrent function of the statute is usurped because busines-
ses find it economically profitable to engage in unfair practices and
simply return a portion of the revenue to the small percentage of
wronged consumers who are able to object. The solution is to insert
a disincentive through the award of exemplary damages.
To encourage private action under section 17200, actual and
punitive damages must be available. There is neither a statutory
bar nor a specific judicial restriction on damage awards for private
litigants under section 17200. The California courts should take
the next logical step in the development of section 17200 and ex-
plicitly allow recovery of damages for unfair business practices.
Conclusion
The proscription of unfair business practices in California that
is contained in section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code
is a veritable sleeping giant.13 7 By defining a minimum standard of
fairness through application of the FTC decisions and trade regu-
lations promulgated under section 5 of the FTCA, potential liti-
gants are afforded greater predictability of the probable outcome
of their claim. Furthermore, by allowing the recovery of compensa-
tory and punitive damages a broader sector of the public will be
encouraged to assert their rights under section 17200. Thus, recog-
nition of minimum standards of fairness coupled with the availa-
bility of damage awards will spur private action and ensure effec-
tive enforcement of section 17200.
137. See notes 3-7 & accompanying text supra.
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